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Summary
The failed attempt by Dubai Ports World (DP World) to operate marine
terminals at some U.S. ports raises the issue of whether foreign marine terminal
operators pose a threat to U.S. homeland security.  Notwithstanding the proposed sale
of U.S. terminal operations by DP World to a U.S. entity, the underlying issue
remains because many U.S. marine terminals are operated by foreign-based
companies and a similar transaction could occur in the future, given the global nature
of the shipping industry.
Evaluating the potential security ramifications of foreign-based terminal
operators requires first understanding how ports work and who is in charge of their
security.  Most major U.S. ports are publicly owned by a “port authority,” which is
a public organization associated with a city, county, regional, or state government.
A port typically contains many terminals that are each designed to handle different
types of cargo.  Some port authorities operate all or some of their marine terminals,
but most ports lease their facilities to several different terminal operating companies.
All of the cargo handling that takes place on a marine terminal is performed by
members of a longshoremen’s union.
The Coast Guard is in charge of the security of port facilities and vessels, and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is in charge of the security of cargo. Coast
Guard regulations and CBP security guidelines require terminal operators to provide
basic security infrastructure, such as fences, gates, and surveillance cameras, and
follow certain security practices when handling cargo.  The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is developing a credentialing process for screening port
workers.  However, port security involves much more than the measures put in place
within the immediate vicinity of a U.S. port complex.  Not finding a terrorist-placed
weapon until after it reaches a U.S. port could be too late to prevent a potentially
catastrophic event.  Thus, securing the cargo and ships in transit to U.S. ports is
critical and  consequently the bulk of federal security activity takes place before cargo
is unloaded at U.S. ports.  Key layers of security are CBP’s scrutiny of U.S.-bound
cargo at the overseas port of loading and the Coast Guard’s scrutiny of ships before
they enter U.S. harbors.  
The necessity of pushing the border out to counter the terrorist threat requires
the cooperation of shippers, carriers, ports, and border agencies in the country of
origin to take security precautions with U.S.-bound cargo.  Global terminal operators
like DP World may handle U.S. cargo at the overseas loading port, even if they do
not handle it at a U.S. port.  Thus, a key issue for policymakers is deciding under
what conditions the United States should trust foreign cargo-handling entities and
whether they should be treated as partners in securing U.S. supply lines. The DP
World controversy refueled debate about whether the nation is doing enough, with
sufficient urgency, to secure U.S. ports.  In its oversight role, Congress is assessing
the effectiveness of Coast Guard and CBP maritime security initiatives and faces
pressing questions about the overall security of ports and maritime commerce.  This
report will not be updated.
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1 For further information on the United Arab Emirates, see CRS Report RS21852, The
United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. 
2 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) reviewed and
approved this transaction.  For further information on CFIUS, see CRS Report RL33312,
The Exon-Florio National Security Test for Foreign Investment, by James K. Jackson.  
3 The text of this announcement is available at [http://www.dpworld.com].
Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S.
Port and Maritime Security
The failed attempt by Dubai Ports World (DP World) to operate marine
terminals at some U.S. ports raises the issue of whether foreign marine terminal
operators pose a threat to U.S. homeland security.  DP World is a terminal operating
company that operates as a commercial entity, but is owned by the Government of
Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.1  DP World recently purchased a competitor, the
British-owned Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O).  P&O
leases marine terminals around the world, including at five U.S. ports – New York
and New Jersey, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, and New Orleans, and is involved
in other cargo handling operations at other East and Gulf Coast ports, as well as a
cruise terminal in New York City.  As part of DP World’s purchase of P&O, DP
World would have acquired P&O’s terminal leases or concessions at these U.S.
ports.2 However, as a result of Congressional opposition, DP World announced on
March 9, 2006 that it will sell its stake in the U.S. portion of P&O’s operations to a
U.S. entity.3 
   
Notwithstanding the proposed sale of U.S. terminal operations by DP World to
a U.S. entity, the underlying issues remain:  Is the ownership of a terminal operating
company relevant to the security of a U.S. port?  Does foreign takeover of terminal
operating leases potentially pose a threat to U.S. security?  Should companies owned
by foreign governments be precluded from operating U.S. port terminals?  These
policy questions remain an issue because (1) many U.S. marine terminals are
operated by foreign-based companies, and (2) given the global nature of the shipping
business, similar transactions may occur in the future.  
The purpose of this report is to provide information relevant in answering these
questions.  It begins by explaining how ports work and what marine terminal
operators do.  It then reviews the extent of foreign involvement that already exists in
U.S. ports.  The next section describes the responsibility of terminal operators in
providing security at U.S. ports and how their role fits in with the larger task of
securing the entire maritime supply chain.  The report concludes by examining port
security issues for Congress.    
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4 An analogy used by the Port of Tacoma, “Questions and Answers: Port Terminal
Ownership, Operations, and Security,” February 24, 2006, Press Release.
5 U.S. Maritime Administration, U.S. Public Port Development Expenditure Report,
November 2005, p. 1.
6 Port of Houston Authority, Fact Sheet, available at [http://www.portofhouston.com].
7 The longshoremen unions negotiate their contracts with a trade association that represents
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Port Administration and Operation
The debate over the DP World transaction often confused the terms “port,” “port
authority,” and “terminal.”  Most major U.S. ports are publicly owned by a “port
authority,” which is a public or quasi-public organization associated with a city,
county, regional, or state government.  A port authority is responsible for the overall
administration of the property, terminals, and other facilities on the port complex.
A marine terminal is an assigned area with equipment for loading and unloading
ships, and space for staging cargo until it is loaded on the ship or transferred to
overland modes of transport.  Some port authorities operate all or some of their
marine terminals themselves, but most ports are “landlord” ports because they lease
their facilities to terminal operating companies (the tenants).  These leases are
typically long-term – in the range of 10 to 30 years.  Either the port authority or the
terminal operator will supply the cranes and other cargo handling equipment.  It
depends on the lease agreement between the port authority and each terminal
operator.  
As one port authority suggests, one can think of a public port like a shopping
mall.4  The port authority owns the entire mall property while the stores are leased
to individual retail companies.  A large port could contain 15 to 20 marine terminals
of various types.  Some of the terminals could handle containers (which are truck-
trailers without the wheels), others may handle dry bulk cargo (such as coal, grain,
or sugar), liquid bulk cargo (such as petroleum or chemicals), breakbulk cargo (such
as steel coils, pipes, or large machinery), or automobiles and trucks.  A typical
container terminal may be 100 to 300 acres in size, while the entire port complex of
a major port may be 2,000 to over 3,000 acres in size.   
While the above model applies to the marine terminals involved in the DP
World transaction, it does not apply to all marine terminals.  Public port authorities
only own approximately one-third of the deep-draft marine terminal facilities in the
United States.5  Many of the privately owned marine terminals are associated with
the oil, gas, and chemical industries.  In these cases, the waterside terminal may be
a component of a larger industrial complex on land.  For instance, at the Port of
Houston, the Port of Houston Authority only owns or leases 12 marine terminals
while there are 138 private terminals that are owned by either U.S.-based, foreign-
based, or multi-national corporations that handle approximately 85% of the cargo that
moves through the Port of Houston.6         
Terminal operators (a.k.a. stevedores) contract with longshoremen unions to
provide cargo handling services on the docks.7  Longshoremen are hired by and
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terminal operators.  
8 Testimony of Robert Scavone, P&O Ports North America, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, hearing on Implementation of Port Security Programs, March 9, 2006.
9 Except that a foreign company has a 50% stake in the operations of one of the terminals
at the Port of Norfolk.
report directly to a union hiring hall.  Terminal operators also employ a management
team who are hired by and report directly to the terminal operating company.
Longshoremen, called “dockworkers,” operate cranes that physically move the cargo
from ship to dock and vice versa.  Longshoremen, called “checkers,” perform clerk
functions in an office in or near the port.  At a container terminal, the checkers  are
responsible for directing the container traffic within the terminal area – they tell the
dockworkers where containers need to be moved.  The ocean carrier provides a
stowage plan which tells the terminal operator where the containers need to be loaded
on the ship.  In the case of inbound shipments, the terminal operator separates those
containers to be picked up by truck from those that will move by rail (if there is an
“on-dock” railroad at the terminal).  Longshoremen also staff the gates where trucks
enter to pick-up and drop-off containers.  
Longshoremen do not know the contents of containers except for containers
carrying hazardous material, which require special handling and storage
requirements.  The terminal operator is not concerned with the origin and final
destination of the shipment.8  The only cargo information relevant to the terminal
operator in performing its function is the weight of the container (for ship loading
purposes), whether or not it has been released by Customs (for imported cargo), the
bill of lading number (or booking number for export cargo), seal number, and
container number. 
An Industry Driven by Globalization
While DP World would have been the first Middle Eastern based company to
operate container terminals in U.S. ports, most container terminals are operated by
other foreign-based companies.  A survey by the U.S. Maritime Administration found
that at the seventeen largest U.S. container ports, 45 terminals (66%) were operated
by a foreign based company, 5 terminals (7%) were operated by a joint venture
between a domestic and foreign based company, and 18 terminals (26%) were
operated by a purely domestic terminal operating company.  The survey found that
several of the ports have no U.S.-based container terminal operators:  Baltimore,
Jacksonville, New Orleans, Houston, Los Angeles, and Tacoma.  At the combined
Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the largest container port complex in the
United States, only three of the fifteen container terminals are operated by U.S.-based
companies.  At the Port of New York and New Jersey, the second largest container
port, only two of the six container terminals are operated by U.S.-based companies.
At the Port of Norfolk and the Port of Savannah, the port authority operates the
terminals rather than leasing them to private terminal operators.9  The Port of
Portland (Oregon) leases its container terminal to a U.S. based operator.  Most of the
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10 Testimony of Christopher Koch, President and CEO of the World Shipping Council,
House Homeland Security Committee, Hearing on SAFE Port Act, April 4, 2006. 
11 Testimony of Gary Gilbert, Senior Vice President, Hutchison Port Holdings, Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on
Investigations, Hearing on Securing the Global Supply Chain, March 30, 2006.
foreign terminal operators are based in Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, China, the United Kingdom, and Denmark.  A handful of terminal
operators are partially owned by the governments of Singapore, Taiwan, and China.
Most U.S. container terminals are managed by foreign companies because
almost all of the container shipping lines are owned by foreign companies.  Typically,
a foreign container shipping line creates a U.S. subsidiary or a U.S. affiliate to
operate the terminals at its busiest U.S. ports to better ensure service quality and
control costs.  Two large U.S.-based container lines and their terminal operations
were sold to foreign interests in the late 1990s.  In 1997, American President Lines
was sold to Neptune Orient Lines, which is partially owned by the government of
Singapore.  In 1999, Sea-Land Service, the U.S. company that pioneered container
shipping in the late 1950s, was sold to Maersk Lines, a Danish carrier.  The president
of the World Shipping Council (WSC) who is also a former executive of Sea-Land
believes that U.S. investors have avoided the container shipping industry because of
its high capital investment requirements, “boom and bust” cycles, intense
competition, and because foreign tax laws are more favorable to shipping.10  
While many terminal operators are affiliated with a steamship line,  independent
terminal operating companies also exist.  DP World and P&O are two of several
global terminal operating companies.  Other global stevedores are Hutchison Port
Holdings, based in Hong Kong; PSA, based in Singapore; and SSA Marine, based
in Seattle.  One estimate is that the four largest global terminal operators handle
about 80% of the containers being shipped worldwide.11  Some U.S. independent
terminal operators only operate in the United States, such as Maher Terminals and
American Stevedores in New York, and Transbay and Marine Terminals Corporation
in Oakland.
Foreign involvement in U.S. port terminal operations is an extension of an
industry driven by globalization.  The largest container shipping lines have extended
their services around the globe because their biggest customers, such as big box
retailers and auto, electronics, and clothing  manufactures, have extended their supply
lines and distribution networks around the globe.  In turn, global independent
terminal operators, such as DP World or P&O, seek to follow their customers, the
shipping lines.  The shipping business is capable of scanning the globe for low-cost
inputs.  For instance, it is not improbable that a ship calling at a U.S. port could have
been built in South Korea, registered in Panama, owned by a Greek company,
operated by a Japanese ocean carrier, captained by a German, and crewed by
Filipinos.  
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12 MTSA regulations are codified at 33 CFR 101 et. seq. 
13 The Coast Guard is also charged with a number of non-homeland security missions:
marine safety, marine environmental protection, fisheries enforcement, aids to navigation,
and others.
14 See 33 CFR Part 105 for a complete listing of port facility security requirements.
Security Requirements of Terminal Operators
Terminal operators are responsible for maintaining security on the property they
rent from the port authority.  Coast Guard regulations and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) security guidelines require terminal operators to provide basic
security infrastructure and follow certain security practices when handling cargo.
These requirements are reviewed in some detail below because they indicate the
specific responsibilities of a terminal operator in providing security at a port.
Coast Guard Requirements
The Coast Guard is in charge of the security of port facilities and vessels, under
the terms of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-340) and the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA12, P.L. 107-295).13  
Facility Security Plan.  Each terminal operator in a port area is required to
conduct a security assessment of their facility as well as write a security plan and
submit it to the Coast Guard for review and approval.14  The Coast Guard does not
mandate specific security equipment or procedures that the terminal operators must
adopt but rather calls for “performance-based” criteria to be used to ensure the
security of the facility.  The security plan provides some leeway for the terminal
operators to tailor their security measures to their particular type of cargo terminal.
In the facility security plan, the terminal owner or operator must specify how it
will address the security vulnerabilities identified in its security assessment.  For
instance, it must restrict access to its facility with fences and a system to identify
unauthorized personnel.  The operator must specify how it will monitor activity at the
facility through the use of some combination of security guards, water-borne patrols,
alarm systems, surveillance equipment, and lighting.  In the case of container
facilities, the operator must specify how it will check container seals and verify that
arriving trucks have legitimate business at the facility.  The facility operator must
conduct periodic security drills and exercises.  It is required to designate a Facility
Security Officer (FSO) who is responsible for ensuring that the facility is in
compliance with Coast Guard regulations and serves as the point of contact for
notifying security threat level changes.  The FSO is also required to keep records for
two years and make them available to the Coast Guard regarding security training
sessions, drills and exercises, security incidents and breaches, changes in security
threat levels, maintenance of security equipment, and other records regarding security
procedures at the terminal. 
The Coast Guard inspects terminals for compliance with security requirements.
July 1, 2004 was the deadline for port facilities to begin operating under their security
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15 GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in FY2006 Budget Request,
March 17, 2005, GAO-05-364T, p. 10.
16 Testimony of Rear Admiral Thomas Gilmour, U.S. Coast Guard, House Armed Services
Committee hearing, National Security Implications of Dubai Ports World’s Takeover of U.S.
Ports, March 2, 2006.
17 CBP was created in the reorganization that followed the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-296), and is comprised of the inspection functions of the legacy US Customs Service,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, and a portion of the
inspectors of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.  CBP is also home to CBP Air
and Marine.
plans. Between then and January 1, 2005, the Coast Guard conducted initial on-site
inspections at approximately 3,150 port facilities in more than 300 U.S. ports to
check on compliance with the security plans.  The Coast Guard plans to conduct
annual compliance inspections at port facilities but the Coast Guard Captain of the
Port, which is the lead federal official in charge of a port area, can also verify
continued compliance at the facilities in his or her area at any time.  To ensure that
inspections reflect the normal course of business at a terminal, the Coast Guard has
indicated that it is using unscheduled or unannounced spot checks to check on
compliance.15  The Coast Guard reports that since July 2004, it has required
corrective action on more than 700 violations of the MTSA security regulations and
that of those 700 plus violations, 44 resulted in major control actions, such as closure
of the terminal until corrective action was taken.16     
Similar to terminal operators, vessel owners must also submit for Coast Guard
approval a security assessment and security plan for their ships.  Because of the close
interface between vessels and facilities (when the vessel is in port), vessel and facility
owners are required to coordinate their security measures and procedures and submit
evidence of this coordination in a document called a “Declaration of Security.”
Facility and vessel owners are required to update and resubmit their security plans
to the Coast Guard every five years or whenever a substantial change is made to their
facility or vessel.
CBP’s Requirements
CBP is in charge of cargo security.  When CBP inspects cargo shipments
arriving from overseas, the terminal operator’s role is to set those shipments aside as
CBP directs.  CBP is the primary federal agency tasked with ensuring the security of
the nation’s borders.17  CBP’s port security mission is to prevent terrorists and
instruments of terror from entering the United States.  Like the Coast Guard, CBP
faces the difficult challenge of achieving a sufficient level of security while not
jeopardizing the efficient flow of commercial goods at the nation’s ports of entry
(POE).  Generally, every shipment, whether it arrives via maritime, truck, rail, or air
cargo container, must be released by CBP before it may enter the commerce of the
United States.  CBP is not only responsible for ensuring the security of the containers
(in terms of preventing their subversion by terrorists and other criminals), but is also
responsible for ensuring that the cargo does not violate any commercial laws of the
United States. 
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Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.  The Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) was initiated in April 2002 as a voluntary
program offering importers expedited processing of cargo and other benefits if they
comply with CBP requirements for securing their entire supply chain.  Currently, C-
TPAT is open to importers, carriers, freight forwarders, customs brokers, U.S. port
authorities, terminal operators, and Mexican and other CBP-invited foreign
manufacturers.  In order to participate in the C-TPAT, applicants must sign an
agreement that commits them to assessing the security of their supply chains, submit
a security questionnaire to CBP, implement a security program in accordance with
C-TPAT guidelines, and  extend their security program to other companies involved
in their supply chain.
Once the applicant company has conducted the security self-assessment and
submitted the security profile, CBP reviews the security profile to develop an
understanding of the company’s security practices.  CBP also reviews information
regarding the company’s trade compliance history and any past criminal
investigations.  Based upon the results of these reviews, CBP will work with the
applicant to address any security concerns discovered during the review, or will
certify the applicant as a C-TPAT certified member.  CBP also conducts what is
called a ‘validation’ of a C-TPAT certified members’ security arrangements.  The
validation process is an on-site review of the supply chain security measures outlined
by the C-TPAT participant in the security profile it submitted to CBP.  CBP has
created Supply Chain Security Specialists (SCSS), who conduct the validation.
During the validation process, the SCSS will meet with company representatives and
potentially visit selected domestic and foreign sites in the C-TPAT participant’s
supply chain.18
C-TPAT security guidelines differ depending on the type of business the
applicant is engaged in.  For instance, importers have a different set of security
guidelines than carriers, or port or terminal operators; and C-TPAT guidelines
recognize that  terminals, for example, vary according to the type of cargo they
handle. As with other C-TPAT participants, U.S. Marine or Port Terminal Operators
(MPTO) must conduct a comprehensive assessment of their international supply
chain (conveyances, foreign facilities, domestic warehouses, etc.) and work with their
business partners to ensure that the appropriate security measures are adhered to
throughout their supply chain.  The security guidelines that MPTO must commit to
implementing and maintaining throughout their supply chains in order to become a
member of C-TPAT include the following categories: conveyance security (to
prevent unauthorized access or tampering); business partner requirements and
security procedures (to ensure that partners commit to C-TPAT guidelines); container
security (procedures for ensuring  proper sealing and container integrity, along with
procedures to report any problems to CBP); physical access controls (identification
badges, visitor and vendor controls, mail screening etc.); procedural security;
personnel security (background checks and investigations, etc.); physical security
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20 Association of American Port Authorities, News Release, February 7, 2006. 
(fences, gates, cameras, alarms systems, etc.); and information technology security.19
As the above discussion indicates, C-TPAT requirements for Port Authorities and
Terminal Operators are similar to the Coast Guard’s security requirements.
Security Infrastructure
Whether the terminal operator or the port authority is responsible for providing
basic security infrastructure, such as perimeter fencing, security gates, lighting,
monitoring equipment, or alarm systems, is likely to be addressed in the terms and
conditions of the lease agreement between the port authority and the terminal
operator.  The geography of a port complex is one factor that could determine
infrastructure security arrangements.  For instance, if there are a group of terminals
that abut one another, then the port authority may be the party that provides perimeter
fencing and a perimeter security gate for access to all the grouped terminals.  On the
other hand, if a particular terminal is isolated from other terminals in a port complex,
then the terminal operator may be responsible for providing security infrastructure.
The federal government has provided funding directly to ports for security
infrastructure.  Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has provided about
$708 million in five rounds of grants to port authorities and individual terminal
operators for security infrastructure.20
Security Personnel
Either the port authority or the terminal operator hires security guards.  Within
the grounds of a terminal, there may be security guard and “port watchmen” positions
defined in the contract between the longshoremen’s union and the terminal operator.
A few of the largest port authorities have their own police force.  The port authority
police force could include both waterside and landside patrols, and police assigned
to port gates.  Other port authorities rely on the police force of the government with
which they are associated, such as city, county, or state police.  
Screening Port Workers
A key issue in port security is the trustworthiness of the people who work in
them.  As per MTSA (46 USC 70105), DHS is responsible for determining whether
a port worker poses a potential terrorism security risk.  The Coast Guard is assisting
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in developing a worker
identification card (Transportation Worker Identification Credential, TWIC) that will
be used to limit access to secure areas of a port or vessel.  MTSA requires that the
card use biometric technology and that the card be issued to only those port workers
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who are not deemed a terrorism security risk as determined by the Secretary of
DHS.21 
TSA’s initial deadline for issuing TWIC cards was August 2004.  The GAO
investigated why TSA missed its initial deadline and found that delays were due to
difficulty in obtaining DHS approval to proceed with the prototype phase, extra time
needed to collect data for a cost-benefit analysis, and additional work required to
assess card technologies.22  The agencies tested a prototype worker card at various
ports in 2005 and implementation of the card is not expected until 2007.  An
unresolved issue, among several,  is deciding what criminal offenses might disqualify
a worker from obtaining a card.
Most port authorities are awaiting the deployment of the TWIC card to provide
an ID system for port workers.  However, a couple of port authorities have an ID card
system already in place.  The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey has had
an ID system for dockworkers since 1953.  The Waterfront Commission of New
York Harbor performs background checks on all longshoremen at the port, who must
be registered and licensed.  The Commission was created in 1953 to fight corruption
at the port.  The Port of Miami introduced an ID system a few years ago.23  Three port
authorities in Florida have begun implementing a state-wide ID system to fulfill
requirements of a Florida state law on port security.24  The Florida law requires a
fingerprint-based criminal history check of port workers.
As long and difficult as it has been to develop a background check and ID
system for U.S. port workers, this effort concerns only one node in the maritime
transportation system.  The United States has no jurisdiction over transportation
workers in overseas ports, as well as the truck drivers, rail workers, and others who
directly handle the cargo on its way to the overseas port.  One of the criteria for C-
TPAT participants is to conduct background checks on their employees.  However,
it is not known how or if CBP validates these checks.  While background checks can
provide some level of assurance as to the trustworthiness of a worker, experience has
shown that individuals, who have undergone much greater scrutiny, such as high
level security clearances, have occasionally proven untrustworthy.      
Security Extends Beyond the Port
Port security involves much more than the measures put in place within the
immediate vicinity of a U.S. port complex.  Securing the cargo and ships in transit
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to U.S. ports is arguably more critical and consequently the bulk of security activity
takes place before cargo is unloaded at U.S. ports.  While U.S. ports are an
acceptable place to interdict illegal drugs and enforce trade laws, not finding a
terrorist weapon until after it reaches a U.S. port could be too late to prevent a
potentially catastrophic event.  In response to this reality, the Coast Guard and CBP
have adopted a strategy of “pushing the borders out” with a layered system of
security measures.  Key elements in this layered strategy are CBP’s scrutiny of U.S.
bound cargo at the overseas port of loading and the Coast Guard’s scrutiny of ships
before they enter U.S. harbors.  Thus, with respect to anti-terrorism measures, U.S.
ports are viewed as the last line of defense rather than the first.   
Overseas Activity
Coast Guard.  Recognizing the international nature of the shipping industry,
the Coast Guard has sought to raise global standards for maritime security.  Through
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations body that
establishes shipping standards, the Coast Guard assisted in the development of a new
international code for maritime security: the International Ship and Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS), which went into effect on July 1, 2004.  The ISPS contains
security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities, and ship owners.
The host government is responsible for enforcing the code.  The ISPS largely
parallels MTSA  with respect to the security requirements of ports and ships. 
The Coast Guard also actively assesses the security of foreign ports that trade
with the United States.  As of March 2006, the Coast Guard has visited 44 foreign
countries to assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures at their ports and has
a goal of visiting 140 countries that trade with the United States by September 2008.
Of the 44 countries visited (which account for 80% of the maritime trade to the
United States), 37 have been found to have substantially implemented the ISPS Code.
The seven that are not in compliance have a deadline for taking corrective actions
before extra security precautions are taken with vessels arriving from their ports.
Vessel Screening.  To counter the terrorist threat in part, the Coast Guard has
sought to improve the quality and advance the timing of information submitted to
them by vessels so that they can better evaluate the terrorism risk posed by ships,
crews, and cargo bound for U.S. ports.  After September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard
instituted new reporting requirements for ships entering or leaving U.S. harbors.  The
former 24-hour advance Notice of Arrival (NOA) was extended to a 96-hour NOA.
The NOA includes detailed information on the crew, cargo, and the vessel itself.  The
Coast Guard evaluates this information and other intelligence to determine what
action it may take, if any, regarding the vessel.  It could board and inspect the ship
in the open ocean, at an anchorage near shore, at the dock, and it may escort the ship
into (and out of) the port to enforce a security zone around the ship.  
The Coast Guard is also deploying a vessel tracking system (the Automatic
Identification System that has a range of 20-30 miles) to monitor ship traffic in U.S.
harbors.  This capability currently exists at 12 U.S. ports and the agency plans to
extend this capability nationwide.  The Coast Guard is also pursuing a long-range
vessel tracking system that will have a range of about 2,000 nautical miles.  
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CBP.  The Container Security Initiative (CSI), one of a series of initiatives
aimed at improving the security of cargo destined for the United States, was initiated
by the U.S. Customs Service (now CBP) in January of 2002 to prevent terrorists from
exploiting containers entering into the United States.  CSI is based on four core
elements:  (1) identifying high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening high-risk containers
at the earliest possible point in the supply chain; (3) using technology to pre-screen
high risk containers quickly; and (4) developing and using smart and secure
containers.  Under the CSI program, CBP officers are sent to participating ports
where they collaborate with host country customs officers to identify and pre-screen
high-risk containers using non-intrusive inspection technology before the containers
are loaded on U.S.-bound ships.  CSI ports provide CBP an opportunity, in
cooperation with host country officials, to screen and potentially inspect cargo
containers before they arrive at U.S. seaports.
CBP continues to expand CSI to additional foreign ports.  As of August 2005,
CSI was operational at 41 foreign ports, covering 73% of the volume of maritime
containers destined for the United States.  CSI was funded at $126 million in
FY2005, $137 million in FY2006, and $139 million has been requested for CSI for
FY2007.  The port of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, became the 35th operational CSI
port on March 26, 2005.25
Cargo Screening.  CBP’s cargo inspections are dependent on receiving
accurate information in a timely manner in order to execute risk assessment and
targeting procedures before shipments arrive at U.S. Ports of Entry.  To give
inspectors adequate information and time to perform a risk assessment on arriving
cargo shipments, the legacy Customs Service published a rule (known as the 24-hour
rule)26 requiring the submission of certain cargo manifest information to Customs 24
hours in advance of the vessel cargo being laden at the foreign port. The Trade Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), as amended, required CBP to develop rules requiring the
mandatory electronic submission of cargo manifest data for all modes of entry.27  The
final rule maintained the 24-hour rule, which applies to all U.S.-bound vessel cargo.28
The 24-hour rule applies to all U.S.-bound vessel cargo, regardless of whether or not
the cargo passes through a CSI port.  CBP is also exploring the acquisition of
additional data that would provide CBP access to data covering the entire movement
of a container: from point of packing to final destination.  CBP has established a
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program called the Advance Trade Data Initiative (ATDI) as the prototype for the
acquisition of this data.  
CBP uses the Automated Targeting System (ATS) in order to identify high-risk
containers requiring additional inspection.  ATS uses electronically filed entry
information to automatically flag high-risk shipments.  ATS standardizes manifest,
bill of lading, entry, and entry summary data and creates integrated records called
“shipments.”  These shipments are then evaluated and scored by ATS using weighted
rules derived from the targeting methods of experienced personnel.  The higher the
score, the more attention the shipment requires, and the greater the chance it will be
targeted for additional enforcement actions (non-intrusive scans or physical
inspection).  When CBP asserts that it screens 100% of U.S.-bound cargo, it is
referring to the use of the ATS system to identify high-risk containers.
Issues for Congress
The port security debate surrounding the DP World purchase of P&O has raised
a number of issues for Congress.  Among them are the degree to which ownership
is relevant to security and what potential threats to security may stem from such
ownership; the federal presence on port grounds that is necessary to insure the
security of a port; and the identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities in the
maritime supply chain.
Terminal Ownership and Security
At issue for policymakers is how to ensure and verify compliance with agreed-
upon security standards in an environment in which terminal ownership is subject to
change and frequently is foreign-based.  DHS seeks a security regime which requires
terminal operating companies to comply with federal security measures regardless
of ownership.  The Coast Guard checks for compliance with physical security
requirements at the terminal.  CBP, through its C-TPAT program, requires terminal
operators to adhere to similar security measures.  CBP is also in charge of deciding
which cargo to physically inspect, with the terminal operator’s role merely to set that
cargo aside as CBP directs.  TSA will be in charge of screening terminal workers
when the TWIC card is implemented.  One could argue that these measures apply
equally to all terminal operators and that therefore the ownership of the terminal
operating company is irrelevant to the security of a port.  However, the credibility of
these federal security requirements also depends on how much of an actual presence
port businesses perceive federal authorities have in the port.  In exercising its
oversight role, Congress is likely to consider whether the Coast Guard and CBP have
enough inspectors to verify compliance with agreed upon security measures.
Foreign Terminal Operators and Owners.  If one believes that stevedore
ownership is relevant to security, then a subsequent question is whether foreign
ownership poses more of a security risk than domestic ownership.  In evaluating
whether foreign terminal operators should be excluded from U.S. ports, more
information as to how many U.S. marine facilities are actually operated or owned by
foreign-based companies would be useful.  As indicated above, most container
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terminals in the United States are operated by foreign companies but container
terminals account for only one type of marine facility.  It is probable that in some
cases, other types of marine terminals are not only operated but also owned by
foreign interests.  While the Maritime Administration has compiled information on
the ownership of container terminals at the largest U.S. container ports, similar
information regarding other types of marine terminals is not readily available. 
It is important to pinpoint exactly what advantage a terrorist group would have
if it had some kind of connection with a terminal operator.  Foreign terminal
operators would gain intimate knowledge of the day-to-day security procedures at the
U.S. terminals they operate and theoretically could pass this knowledge on to a
terrorist group.  However, U.S.-based terminal operators would have the same
knowledge and a terrorist group could infiltrate them also.  Because foreign terminal
operators hire mostly Americans to work in their terminals, they may pose no more
security risk than a U.S.-based company.  One could view foreign companies like DP
World as mostly the financiers behind the terminal operation with little or no
involvement in the day-to-day running of the terminals.  
Defining the potential threat posed by foreign terminal operators is important
because there are also drawbacks to banning them from U.S. ports.  Cargo security
policy is about striking an appropriate balance between security and commerce.  It
also involves balancing security and capital investment.  Port facilities depend on
large capital investments.  The piers, wharfs, cranes, and elevators needed to load and
unload ships; the storage yards, warehouses, or tank farms needed to store cargo; the
dredging of shipping channels and berths; and landside connections to interstate
highways and transcontinental railroads are all expensive infrastructure.  Thus, the
issue of foreign terminal operators involves guaranteeing security while remaining
attractive to sources of capital.
A Border-centric or Systems Approach to Security
Because it could be too late if a terrorist weapon is discovered after it arrives at
a U.S. port, the security of U.S. ports necessarily relies on the cooperation of
shippers, carriers, ports, terminal operators, and border agencies in the country of
origin to begin the screening process.  Key policy questions are:  Should the United
States trust these foreign entities?  Should they be treated as partners and allies in
securing maritime commerce?  Because there are two ends to America’s supply line,
the answer to both may be a qualified “yes.”  For instance, although DP World will
not be handling any U.S. cargo in U.S. ports, it will be handling U.S. cargo at ports
of origin in China, Hong Kong, Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and
elsewhere.
In evaluating the DP World transaction or others like it, it is appropriate to
consider the extent to which the United States depends on foreign entities to secure
its supply chain.  CSI depends on the cooperation of the host government of the
overseas port of loading to inspect U.S. bound cargo.  C-TPAT depends on the
cooperation of overseas manufacturers and overland carriers to protect U.S. bound
shipments from terrorist infiltration.  ISPS relies on the cooperation of foreign
governments and foreign-flag carriers to enforce port and vessel security codes.  As
one maritime industry spokesperson stated:
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This is an international business with an international problem.  The only way
it’s going to be addressed effectively is through international efforts, which
means the U.S. isn’t going to do it all, nor can it do it all.29 
Assessing DHS Maritime Security Initiatives
While the DP World issue spotlighted the role of terminal operators in port
security, the initial debate about who should be operating U.S. ports quickly
broadened into a debate about whether U.S. ports are secure.  The DP World
controversy refueled debate about whether the nation is doing enough, doing it with
enough urgency, and spending enough on U.S. port and maritime security.30
Members of Congress have referred to ports as the “soft underbelly” in U.S.
homeland security,31 to the shipping container as a modern day “Trojan horse,”32 and
have argued that there are still “massive blind spots” in the maritime security
regime.33  While no one asserts that enough has already been done to strengthen
security, post-9/11 initiatives like CSI, ATS, C-TPAT, MTSA, and ISPS have, most
acknowledge, created a framework for building a maritime security regime.  
An issue of likely interest to Congress is the effectiveness of these maritime
security initiatives.  GAO has issued a number of reports addressing post-9/11
security initiatives.  GAO has reported several factors limiting CSI, including staffing
imbalances and lack of technical requirements for NII equipment used at foreign
ports.34  A number of concerns have also been raised by GAO regarding the C-TPAT
program including the scope of effort and level of rigor applied to the validation
process; how many and the types of validations that are necessary to manage security
risk; and various staffing issues.35  The ATS system and CBP’s targeting strategy more
generally have been scrutinized by GAO in reports that criticize the strategy for not
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incorporating all the key elements of a risk management framework, and not being
entirely consistent with recognized modeling practices.36  Also, the DHS Inspector
General published the results of an audit of CBP’s targeting procedures, and
concluded that improvements were needed regarding the data used by ATS,
examination results should be used to refine ATS targeting rules, and physical
controls over containers could be improved.37  The DHS Inspector General has also
raised concerns about the effectiveness of port security grants.38  The GAO has also
identified difficulties in deploying radiation scanners at U.S. ports39 and it has
reviewed the Coast Guard’s ability to use risk management to guide its port security
mission.40  The CBP and Coast Guard have begun implementing many of the GAO’s
and OIG’s recommendations.      
Prioritizing Maritime Security Risks
A major concern for policymakers is assessing what is most at risk in the
maritime domain and allocating the nation’s resources accordingly.  Three significant
security issues in the container supply chain have been identified: (1) the integrity of
the container packing process at the overseas factory or warehouse, (2) the integrity
of the subsequent truck movement from the factory or warehouse to the overseas port
of loading, and (3) the integrity of the manifest information that CBP uses, in part,
to target high risk shipments for inspection.41  Because there is no fool-proof way to
address these vulnerabilities, some security experts call for greatly increasing the
percentage of containers that are physically inspected.  Others question whether a
determined terrorist would not be able to find an inexpensive solution to circumvent
screening technology. 
While the threat of a shipping container being used as a “Trojan horse” by
terrorists has received much attention, debate persists about the likelihood that
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terrorists would use them for such purpose.  The GAO reports that while shipping
containers are vulnerable, an extensive body of work by the FBI, academic, think
tank, and business organizations concluded that the likelihood of such use to smuggle
a weapon is considered low.42  Some contend that a more likely tactic is that terrorists
would attempt to smuggle a weapon using private watercraft and land at a public
marina because they could remain in control of the weapon and avoid the scrutiny
that occurs at official ports of entry.  Terrorists could also smuggle a weapon in other
types of cargo, such as motor vehicles or breakbulk cargo.  They could repeat the
attack method used against the USS Cole or the Limberg in which terrorists rammed
a small boat packed with explosives into the hulls of these ships.  They could employ
this tactic against a cruise ship, a ferry, or a ship carrying hazardous cargo.
The issue for Congress is how to protect U.S. ports and the supply chains on
which the U.S. economy depends.  Congress faces pressing questions about the
overall security of ports and maritime commerce; the amount of funding that will be
required to secure the maritime transportation system; and the amount of federal
presence in ports that is necessary to prevent or deter terrorist use of ports as a
destination or transit point for attacks on the United States.
